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In the Supreme Court
of the State of lJta.h

PJIYLLIS K. STUBER,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

(

l-IARVE'\:"" T. STUBER,

Case No. 7764

)

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent herein concedes that the statement of facts
as contained in the brief of .A.ppellant, insofar as the divorce
being granted and the provisions of the decree of divorce:
together with the affidavit of Re_spondent for an order to show
cause against the Appellant, the answer of Appellant thereto
and the reply of Respondent to Appellant,s answering affidavit
as set forth in the brief of Appellant fron1 pages 1 to 5 are
substantially correct and we need not set them forth herein
(Tr. 1-15).
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Pursuant to the foregoing the matter was transferred to
the trial calendar for trial and said matter came on for hearing
before the Honorable Judge Martin M. Larson on the 14th
day of May 19 51, and after a trial being had on the issues
raised by the respective pleadings of said parties, the court took
the matter under advisement, and thereafter, on or about the
1Oth day of September 19 51 rendered its decision _herein
( T r. 88-89-90) . Pursuant thereto the court signed and entered
its findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment
therein on the' lOth day of September 1951 (Tr. 91 to 96 inc.)
Thereafter Appellant filed a Motion for Amendment of Findings and Judgment, (Tr. 98-99-100), whic~ motion, after
hearing thereon was denied by the court on th~ 6th day of
October 1951, (Tr. 101), from which judgment and denial
of motion the Appellant takes this appeal ( T r. 102) .
In the abstract of Appellant he raises the following points
in which he contends the ·court erred in its decision:

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT
AWARDING THE CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL
OF THE MINOR CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, TO THE
RESPONDENT AND ERRED IN FAILING TO MODIFY
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE SO AS TO AWARD THE
CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL OF THE MINOR
CHILD TO THE APPELLANT, SUBJECT TO REASONABLE VISITATION BY THE RESPONDENT.
4
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDG~1ENT
IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT AND AGAINST APPELLANT FOR THE SU~f OF $220.00, BEING THE AMOUNT
FOR WHICH RESPONDENT WAS AT SAID TIME INDEBTED TO THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVE:t\TlJE .L~RISING OUT OF THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT
FOR A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS CLr\IMED THE MINOR
CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, AS A DEPENDENT IN HER
INC0~1E TAX RETURN AND ALSO ERRED IN REQUIRING THE APPELLANT TO PAY ANY OTHER SUM OR
SUMS FOR \VHICH THE RESPONDENT lviiGHT BEC0~1E OBLIGATED TO PAY THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE BY REA~SON OF RESPONDENT
CLAI~1ING S.AJD CHILD AS A DEPENDENT.

-POINT III
TI-fE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENl'ER JUDG·
1v!ENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT AND AGAINST THE
RESPONDENT MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
SO AS TO RELIEVE 1-.HE APPELLANT FROM TI-IE Pi\. Y1v1ENT OF FUT.UR.E- }-'-LIMOI\TY TO RESPONDENT.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RESPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF $100.00.
5
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ARGUMENT
These joints of error raised by appellant will be taken up
tn their respective order and replied to by Respondent, in
which Respondent contends that the court's decision, findings
of fact and conclusions of law and judgment were in accordance with the testimony of the respective parties, and that the
court did not err in rendering its decision and judgment in accordance therewith:

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT
AWARDING THE CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL
OF THE MINOR CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, TO THE
RESPONDENT AND ERRED IN FAILING TO MODIFY
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE SO AS TO AWARD THE
CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL OF THE MINOR
CHILD TO THE APPELLANT, SUBJECT TO REASONABLE VISITATION BY THE RESPONDENT.
As the issue of the ·marriage between these two people,
they had one minor child, Bruce Stuber, who was some 14
· months of age at the time of the divorce, and at the time. of
this hearing said child wa~ 7 years of age (Tr. 20).
At the time of the divorce, the respondent had no home
to go to, and could not live with her parents because of the
crowded condition of their home (Tr. 43-44), nor did the
Respondent have anything upon which to live and she. had
to go to work. to support herself (Tr. 21). She, however,
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tnade an atten1pt to take saiJ chilJ and care for it, but she
stated that she lived \vith another g~rl \vho had a child of her
own and she was not \veil and she could not care for the child
of the respondent, nor could the respondent leave the child
with her mother because of the inability of her mother at
that time to care for the child (Tr. 21).
Respondent testified as-.

follo\\~s:

((He, (Appellant), told me that, when we \vere
separated, that he wouldn't pay any money for the
child nor myself if he had to rot in jail, so I let Bruce
go down there to live.'
Under the circumstances there \vas nothing the Respondent could do, but take the matter up with Appellant as to the
care of the child.
Respondent testified further as follows:

((So I talked with Mr. Stuber about it; as a matter of
fact he approached me or Bruce of coming to live vv-ith
him, saying his mother could watch him. I agreed to
that proposition; for one thing, I didn't have the money
to take care of him myself, nor no place to put hitn,
and 1 agreed to it, "'ith the understanding that \vhen
I got where I could take him back, I wanted hin1 back.
We made an understanding that. he wouldn't pay
me ... (Tr. 21).
She further testified as follows:
((So I let Bruce go down there to live. We also talked
about who would claim Bruce as a dependent. I said
I \\yould, and he agreed to it." (Tr. 22).
7
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Q. Now cc as a dependent" for what purpose?

A. For the purpose of claiming him on the income
tax. He wouldn't pay me any money other than
that; that was our agreement.
Q. So, pursuant to that, you let him take the child?

A. Yes, I did." (Tr. 22).
Since that time the respondent testified she has not been
in a position to take said child or care for it until now, as follows (Tr. 23):
Q. No\v, have you been in a position financially, or
otherwise, to take this child and support the childprovide a place for it since that time ?

A. Not until right now.
Q. And will you tell the court now what your position
is with relation to taking care of the child?
A. My mother has agreed to take care of Bruce, keep
him with her all the time and take care of him until
I remarry so that I can tak~ care of him myself."

On cross-examination of respondent about her remarriage, she testified as follows (Tr. 34):
Q. Have you never

remarr~ed,

Mrs. Stuber?

A. No, I haven't.
Q. And, so far ·as you know, at the present time you
don't expect to marry in the near future?

A. I wouldn't say when, but I am going to get married.
Q. Well, you mean you have a prospect now?
A. Yes.

s
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A. -of contracting marriage. Are you acquainted with
Mr. Fred E. Bacon?
A. Yes.
Q. Is he the man you expect to marry?
A. Yes.

Under the Statute- of the State of Utah, and generally
everY'vhere, the mother of a child has the paramount right to
the custody of a minor child, other matters bieng equal.
Section 40-3-10 U.C.A. 1943:
(tin any case of separation of husband and wife having minor children, the mother shall be entitled to the
care, control and custody of all child children, etc.''
Cook vs. Cook, U. 371, 248 Pac. 83:
('In case of separation of husband and wife, the
wife usually has no separate income apart from that
of the husband. Such, however, is no legal reason to
deny her the custody of· the minod child." 18~, S. \Y/.
215 Ky.
Respondent has no contention with the assertion of Appellant in his argument and citation of the case of Walton V.
Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169, Pac. 2nd 97, that:
((Child custody proceedings are equitable in the
highest degree, and this court has consistently held
that the best interest and welfare of the minor child
is the controlling .factor in every case."
and we agree with this doctrine, and it is the contention of the
Respondent that the best interest of said child will be with her
9
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and under her care, and in support of this contention we submit
and refer to the evidence in this case.
The only reason that Respondent ever let go of this child
was because of financial inability to take and care for the
child as appears from the evidence she introduced at the trial
and referred to· hereinabove. She stated that she has never
been in a position to take said child until now, but was now
·in a position to take a.nd properly care for the child. Appellant
argues that because of the fact that Respondent did not visit
v1ith the child for the first two years after she let the Appellant
have the child, that the Respondent has any interest in the
child. We think the Respondent answers that question very
well in her testimony as follows (Tr. 29-30):

Q. For the first two years after Mr. Stuber took him,
you hardly seen him, did you?
A. That's true.

Q. About two years, you didn't see him at all ?
A. No, I felt like that, -if Bruce was going to stay
there like he was, and I couldn't see any outlet as
to how I was going to take care of him, I just felt
it was for his own good that he had but very few
people to take care of him and interfere as possible. I. wanted very much to see him, but I just
couldn't see how I could make it, and I figured
that it would just be better if he was left there
like it was. I thought at the time he was better
taken care of than he might have been, and I really
couldn't say_ because I didn't see him in that long
period of time."
I am of the opinion this was a very reasonable and logical

explanation on the part of Respondent why she did not see
10
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the child during this period. She had confidence in the ability
of the Appellanf s mother to see that the child was taken care
of properly, as she knew the qualities of the Appellant's
mother. That to interfere with the child, by way of frequent
visits, would endear the child to the mother, (Respondent), and
"·ould have a disturbing effect upon the child. Respondent,
under her financial and home condition, just could not take the
child for the present or could not see her way clear in this
respect for some time ahead. I think her wisdom in not seeing
the child, (although she stated she '\\ranted very much to see
him) , was good judgn1ent on her part and should not detract
from her interest in the child. After this period of time she
stated that she visited \vith the child at least twice a month,
(Tr. 30), and has continued to do so. That she would have
liked to have seen him more often had conditions been more
favorable. There 'vas an undercurrent feeling existing between
the Appellant and Respondent, which apparently prevented this
as stated by Respondent in the following testimony ( T r. ·30) :
Q. And when you did start seeing him, how often
would you say you have seen him, about once a
month?

A. I have seen hitn more often than that, but, as I
said, I would go down more often if I was treated
like I was a human being. (Tr~ 31).
Q. What is it you object to because we want to make
it pleasant for you when you go to see the child?

A. Well, I don't see why l have to stand outside, not
that I really care to go in, that isn't the point, but
at least people can.· treat you civil whei1 you go to
get your own child.
Q. Well, you mean they didn't iny.ite you in the house?
11.
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A. No, they never have since I and Harvey have been
divorced.
Q. In other words, you go there to get the child, then
you knock and wait until they bringA. I knock and stand there, or he looks out the door.
Q. Is that what you mean when you say you haven't
been treated with proper courtesy ?

A. Well, then I have to call up to get Bruce, and Mr.
Stuber himself raised a big commotion. The child
pleaded, .cried to go with me. Mr. Stuber wouldn't
let him go at first, then he would call me up, say
he could go because Bruce wanted to go, and, in
the first place, I don't see why he wouldn't let
him go when he wanted to go ~ith me. (Tr. 23).

Q. Well, by reason of what?
A. When I go down to see him, I am never asked ·
into their home. I am treated like an outsider. I
have even had the door slamm~d in my face.
From the foregoing and other testimony of the Respondent (Tr. 39) it is made plain why the Respondent felt she was
not free to see her child as often as she liked and rather than
have such, difficulties as she complained of she did not see
the child. She used good judgment in this respect.
As to the question of the welfare of the child, Appellant
states in his brief (p. 18), tcThe Respondent, herself, was
unable to· disclose any want of care and consideration for the
child." I ask th~ court to consider the following (T'r. 24) :
Q. What is the relationship between you and the
child; in other words, how does he feel towards you
and you tovlard him, frotn your observations?

A. We get along very well. He seems to en joy being
12
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with me. I enjoy being with him very much. (Tr.
27-28).

Q. Yes, and there has never been any time you know
of when Bruce hasn't been well taken care of?
A. I don't think he has been so well taken care of.
Q. Well, since when?
A. Since all the family went to work.
Q. Well, put it this way then: So far as you observed
the situation, he wasn't as well taken care of after
Mrs. Stuber-that is Mr. Stuber's mother-went
to work?
A. Well, he was quite \veil taken care of, but I still
don't think they gave him the love and affection
that he needs. It is quite hard, I imagine, for people
worlqng to take interest in what goes on, I imagine
it would be. I know that, at times, I have got him
when he hasn't been as clean as I would liked to
see him be.
Q. Well, that's the only thing you noticed?
A. He is very thin and very nervous, and I imagine it
is hard on him, as well as everyone concerned, to
have so many bosses. He is very emotional, he
runs constantly. He isn't much interested in very
many things. I have asked him about things; he
doesn't like school. I have asked him how heoh, what he does with his time, and ne never gives
n1e an answer. He doesn't have any interest iri
anything, as far as I can understand, jt:lst what he
has told me. He has colds constantly .. He is always
sick, it seems like.
Q. Now, from your observation and wh~t you know,
Mrs. Stuber, is Mr. Stuber and his present \vife and
his mother, with whom the child ·lives, are all
working?

13
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A. Yes, they are.
Q. And how long has that ··been?-

A. Oh, it has been quite _sometime. I wouldn't say for
sure.
A. Harvey's :present wife has been working ever since
s~e had her baby, as far as I know.

_Q... When_ they are _working, what becomes of your
child?

·

·

}\._He is put in the hands of a baby-tender.
Q. Has that been over a period, to your own knowledge?

A.

Quit~

some time, I imagine. I know this one woman ·
who is _going to testify in court was there, from
what -she ·told me, for almost a year.

Q. :Now, have you made inquiry with relation to
Bruce's attendance at school? (Objection) .
Q. What have you fourid out, Mrs. Stuber-not a conversation :you have had, but what are the facts you
have found?

.,

..

£!.(~ -~~ ~~~ :~: ~

A. W9en Bru.,ce was first put in school, he wasn't even
in schqol for almost a month. The teacher contacted
the horne and· tried to get hold of the parents or
his stepmother or father, and they got no reaction
whatsoever from them. He was absent an awful
lot.· lfe ·+was back ·in· his. school 'work·. Then they
. took him deer hunting or ·somewhere for a couple
of weeks. ·she said- it was-·-he was in and out of
-·school
much-they seemed to take no interest
in it at all. She ev-en wrote ·notes· home and got no
reply.

su

. _ ,~_Fro~ furt~er ~-~~stimony of Respondent, and from inforobtain~d ~tqm the school, the child has been playing
mat19n

she

14
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truant; that no one took enough interest in him to help him
along with reading etc. (Tr. 38).
have quoted at some length. from the transcript, but this
I have done for the purpose of apprising the court in detail
as to the neglect and conduct of this child.
This child is and has been in the home of the father and
his mother. The Appellant remarried and has one child. They
all live in the same home. Mr. Stuber is a railroad man and is
away from home a good portion of hi~ time. His wife has
been working most of her married life. His mother likewise
has to work and the child is left with a baby tender during
their absence from the home. The child cannot, under the
circumstances, receive the care and attention he justly deserves
and from these facts it is apparent we can account for the
conduct of the child, and if continued, we cannot see that it
is going to be for the best interest of the child.
While it is true these facts as testified to by Respondent
were controversial in many respects by. the Appellant, but
who was in a better position to judge the truth of these things
than the judge hearing the case, as he· states in his decision
(Tr. 88-89-90):
''The foregoing; statement is the background facts
as founq by the court from the evidence adduced at
. the hearing, which findings are, in the court's mind,
the only _consistent fi~~ings one could . make after see. ing. the witnesses and hearing. the testimony in regard
to those matters. . ·
·
~-~ ~ ~:'"~
. . . finds that the best . interests of the minor
child, Bruce, .requires that he be ~eturn~d to the custody
and control of the plaintiff, his ·mother, where the
:15
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original decree of divorce placed him; that the plaintiff
. is a most fit ~nd suitable person to have the care and
custody of said minor child; and concl~des from all
the evidence in the case and the .attitude of the parties
at t-he hearing, and matters \vhich don't appear upon
the printed page, that the interests of the minor child
would not be observed, but would be endangered,
by awarding its custody to the defendant."
In support of this proposition we quote from the decision
of this court in the case of Walton v. Coffman et ux, 169
p 2d 97:
((As before stated this is an equity case. Harrison
v. Harker, Supra; Jones v. Moore, Supra; Jensen v.
Earley, Supra Wallick v._ Vance, Supra In re Barry,
Supra. It is therefore our duty to carefully examine the
record and make an independent determination of what
the facts are. In so doing we should keep in mind that_
the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor and was acquainted with the
circumstances. surrounding the giving of their testimony, and therefor \vas in a better position than we
are to weigh and evaluate their evidence. Stanley v.
Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 Pac. 2d 465, concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe commencing at page 527
of 97 Utah, 94 P. 2d 465."
Appellant sets forth the fact that if the child is to go
witf?. ·Respondent, its· mother, she will have no better home. to
t~ke it to than he h~s at present. It is true that temporarily
the child will be taken to the home of the mother of Respondent,
but I respectfully request the court to examine the. testimony
of Mrs. Ethel Kalian, the mother of Respondent as contained
in.: (Tr.- 41. to 48 inc.), in ·which she testifies to the condition
of her home and the care that will be given to this child and

16
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the love she has for him and the love he has for her, which
will be until the Respondent remarries, which she expects to
do in the near future. The child will be at least under the
control of its mother, "'here it will be under her direction,
without confusing the child as to having Htoo many bosses.,
I respectfully request the court to determine this from her
testimony and the testin1ony of Respondent in this respect.
Appellant has attempted to show, in a weak manner, that
the Respondent is not a fit and proper person to take care of
her child, because she was then and had been going out with
a married man, (Tr. 34-35) (Tr. 84) and that Respondent
was living at No. 234 North Main Street in Salt Lake City,
and was registered there during all of that period as Mr. and
Mrs. Fred Bacon, which Respondent admitted, but for some
unknown reason counsel for Appellant did not press this issue,
and there is no further testimony as to why Respondent was
registered under the name of Mr. and Mrs. Fred Bacon_at that
address. I-Iad he pressed this the true and proper reason
would have been brought out, which would have its explanation
from an economic basis and no other.
The foregoin~ is all that was attempted to be proven by the Appellant of the unfitness of the ~espondent to have her
child. The mere fact of her going with a married man, whose
divorce from his former wife was then pending, and she intended to marry him in due time, is ·certainly no evidence of
her unfitness to have her child.
The court said in Cooke v. Cooke et al, 248 P. 83, at page
108:
·17
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CCThen~

too, the unfitness which deprives a parent of
_the right to the custody of the .child must be positive,
and not .m~!ely comparative? or merely speculative. And
too, ~s her'etofore observed, the referee with respect to
this . matter had before him the witnesses and heard
their testimony. and found that there was .'no evidence
or even a suspicion of. improper .relations between the
defendant and Welch.' Thus a finding that the de.· fendant is unfit to have the custody of the child is
· not, on the record del!landed or justified."
We think we need not go further into this, as the evidence
is entirely lacking as to the unfitness of Respondent to have
and take care of her child.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN E:t~TERING ITS JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT AND AGAINST APPELLANT FOR THE SUM OF $220.00, BEING THE AMOUNT
FOR WHICH RESPONDENT WAS AT SAID TIME INDEBTED TO THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL· REVE:NLJE ARISING OUT OF THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT
FOR·A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS CLAIMED THE MINOR
CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, AS A DEPENDENT· IN HER
INCOME TAX RETURN AND ALSO ERRED IN REQUIRING THE APPELLANT TO PAY ANY OTHER SUM OR
SUMS FOR ·WHICH THE RESPONDENT MIGHT BECOME OBLIGATED TO PAYTHE COLLECTOR OF IN~
TERNAL REVENl.J~ BY .REASON OF_ RESPONDENT
CLAIMING, SAID,· CHILD AS A DEPEN.DENT.
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As outlined hereinabove, upon the granting of the divorce
in favor of the Respondent and against the Appellant, the
Respondent was not in a financial condition to care for the
child, and that she had to go to work to support herself. The
child \Yas temporarily placed with her mother some two months.
(Tr. 20). The mother of Respondent, because of her
crowded condition at her home was not able to care for the
child further and it was necessary for Respondent to find a
suitable place for the child. She testified that the Appellant
told her:
HWhen we were separated, that he wouldn't pay me any
money for the child nor myself if he had to rot in jail, so I let
Bruce go down there to live (T-22). ((We also talked about
who would claim Bruce as a dependent. I said I would, and
he agreed to it." (Tr. 22). That was for the purpose of her
income tax. She further stated on cross~examination as follows:

Q. Now, are you sure--positive--there was anything
in the agreement about his, about your taking the
<;hild as a dependent ?
A. We talked about it very definitely (Tr. 33).
In view of the statement of the Appellant, that he would
not give to Respondent any money for the child or herself
and that he would rather rot in jail, and her inability to take
care of the child, the Respondent was placed in a position where
she had to do the best she could under the circumstances. She
stated definitely that if the Appellant would take the child,
she would not expect to receive anything for the support of
the child, but at no time did she release the Appellant from
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the payment of alimony. She testified in response to a question
of . Appellant's counsel, that the agreement was to relieve
Appellant from the payment of alimony, that CCI told him if
Bruce was well taken care of, there wouldn't be any trouble
( T r. 27) . Again the question was put to Respondent by
counsel and she testified: cc I didn't say :he should be released."
(Tr. 33).
1·he Appellant denies that· anything was said about permitting Respondent to take the child as a dependent on her
income tax, but the court found that such an agreement was
tnade and in accordance there\vith held that she had waived her
right to alimony in any sum in excess of that which
plaintiff shall be required to pay to the Federal Government, but in accordance with such an a greement that
she should be entitled to the amounts she would be compelled to pay the Collector of Internal Revenue by reason of
taking the child as a dependent.
It is the contention of Respondent that until such time
as the court modifies a decree for the payment of alimony,
that the decree stands and the unpaid alimony accrues, unless
by circun1stances,. the party entitled to it in some manner
Vv'aives it, \vhich the court~ in this case found Respondent had
done except as ~tipulated in their agreement and in place
thereof. substituted the agreement between said parties
to permit · ·the Respondent to take the ·child as a depend~nt, and that the Appell~nt had breached this agreement with the Respondent. · Respondent has not been mercenary. regarding this matter and has not certairtly imposed
any unreasonable hardship on Appellant by giving up something far more substantial than she Was to receive.
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I feel reasonably certain that unless said agreement was
actually made between these two parties, Respondent would
not have taken or continued to take the child as a dependent
on her income tax as a n1eans to get someting out of the Appellant in an indirect manner. What prompted her to take
the child as a dependent if it \vasn' t the agreement~
Appellant contends that it was her duty at least to notify
him of this-that he knew nothing about it until before Christmas_, 1950. I cannot see where this makes any difference.. Respondent is in a like con~tion wi~ Appellant as he contends
for. She did not know that he was taking the child as a dependent during this time and he never notified her. Had she known
this, she would have in all probabiliyt taken some action against
the Appellant to straighten this out. She certainly knew that
both of them could not take the child as a dependent and she
would not have continued to take the child and get herself into
difficulties with the Internal Revenue Department, which must
inevitably come, and did come. Because of the delay on the
part of the Internal Revenue Department in discovering these
things, she was not notified by them until some three years
after she had been taking the child as a dependent. This question resolves itself on a quetsion of fact, and the court so found
that such an agreement was made and Appellant certainly cannot complain in getting off as easily as he did in this decision.
If such an agreement .was not made, then the Respondent
would be entitled to all accrued alimony, unless otherwise
waived through the latches of Respondent, or from some other
sufficient cause, which we do not think she did in this case.
Respondent never remarried, never waived or released the
Appellant from the alimony, nor did he at any time petition
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the court to modify- the decree in· relation thereto, and just.
because he took care ·of the child this certainly does not relieve
him from the alimony judgment for the Respondent. I think
the complaint should come from the Respondent, rather- than
the Appellant, with relation to the finding of the court.
..

We think nothing further need be said about this and
lef the matter -be submitted on the testimony of said parties
as to vtho was correct in this.
POINT III
THE CO_URT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT AND AGAINST THE
RESPONDENT MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
SO AS TO RELIEVE THE APPELLANT FROM THE PAYMENT OF FUTURE ALIMO~TY TO RESPONDENT.

Under Section 40-3-5 U. C. A._ 1943, the court always
retains jurisdiction of divorce action so as to modify the decree
- entered to. fit the circumstances of the parties where there is
changed conditions_ which would justify a modification, such as
the disposition of the children, support of children, and
alimony.
We respectfully submit that the Appellant in his answer
(Tr. 9 to 15) has made no allegations with respect to changed
conditions of said ·parties since the decree- was entered which
would entitle hirri to a modification of the decree. It is true
that temporary arrangements were made between said parties,
themselves with ·relation to the custody of the child and its
s-upport until· such time as Respondent was in a position to
againtakecareofthe child. She is now in a position to properly
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care for the child and under the evidence the court has seen
fit, in its discretion, to grant her the right to take the child
into her custody according to the provisions of the original
decree, and the court did not see fit to disturb the provisions
of the original decree. Had the court seen fit to deprive the
Respondent of the custody of the child in this hearing and
award the custody of the child to Appellant, then the question
of support money and alimony should probably have been
been modified to fit the circumstances, but inasmuch as the
court did not see fit to change the provisions of the <?riginal
decree, the Appellant has _shown no grounds of changed circumstances which would justify a modification of the decree.
The Respondent has never remarried, nor has her financial
condition changed sufficiently to justify a reduction of alimony
or support money. She testified she was earning about $130.00
per month, (Tr. 41) and has been supporting herself with
this. Her earnings are net sufficient for her to properly take
care of and educate this child without the assistance on the
part of the Appell~nt, in view of the increased cost of living
since this divorce has been granted. $~,o~oo a month is not
sufficient to care for this child, nor the sum of $50.00 a month
as alimony is certainly not excessive to further aid her in this
duty.
The only changed circumstances that the Appellant has
shown is that he has remarried. In fact, that has enhanced
his financial condition as both he and his wife have been working and are working. His income as testified to by him is
$400.00 per month with a take home pay of approximately
$350.00 per month (Tr. 49). His present wife testified she
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is earning $90.00 every two weeks, without deductions (Tr.
73). They have only one child to support. Mr. Stuber, the
Appellant, testified that he has been paying to his mother the
sum of $60.00 per month for the care of the child in question
without objection, but now he wants the court to modify the
decree, cutting down the alimony to Respondent. With his
income and the income of the Appellant, with the increased
cost of living, and the increasing cost of caring for and educating this child, we are firmly of the opinion that Appellant
has shown no changed circumstances to justify this..
Our courts have repeatedly held that unless sufficient
changed circumstances are shown, the court has no authorityto modify a decree· in this respect.
This is well supported in the case of Hamilton v. Hamilton, 58 P. 2d, 11, wherein the court said:
UThe power of a court to make amendments in
particulars authorized by the statute just quoted is
not without limits. Thus, in the absence of changed
conditions or circumstances, a modification of a decree
may not be had. Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 Pac.
952; Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah, 150, 193 P. 1093,
15 A. L. R. 620; Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah, 112, 202 P.
213; Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah, 261, 225 Pac. 76;
Carson v. Carson, (Utah) 47 P. 2d 894.
We think we need nor argue this question further, as it
is a matter of fact which is based on the evidence and showing
here, that the Appellant has neither alleged or proven any
changed circumstances which would justify the court, in its,
discretion, to modify the decree with relation to alimony.
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RESPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF $100.00.
Appellant argues that because of the holding of the
court that the Respondent was not entitled to recover fron1
the Appellant the amount she sued for in arrears on alimony,
to-wit: $3,500.00, she was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees.
She was compelled to bring her action against the Appellant to force him to do anything by way of paying alimony
or the recovery of the custody of the said child.
The court in its decision (Tr. 89) states as follows:
and that defendant should not be held liable
for any arrearages of support money, nor in the payment of alimony in any sum in excess of that which
plaintiff shall be required to pay to the Federal Government, as indicated above in this m~morandum, but
that defendant should pay to the plaintiff or for her
use and benefit such sums as plaintiff may be compelled to pay the Federal Government as deficiencies
on her income tax.''
H

•

•

•

In accordance with the coutt' s decision the court made and
entered in its findings of fact regarding this matter the following (Tr. 93):
"The plaintiff has waived her right to receive from
the defendant any amount as alimony payments in
arrears in excess of the amount or amounts she will
be compelled to pay the Collector of Internal Revenue
as herein set forth.''
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While it is true .the court found that the plaintiff was
not entitled to recover the full amount she asked for as unpaid
alimony, but the amount the court did allow her, which was .
the amount she would have to pay to the Collector of Internal
Revenue, was designated as alimony in the decision of the
court and in the findings. If this amount was designated as
alimony, which I construe it to be by the wording of the decision
of the court and in its findings, then the argument of the Appellant fails. The fact that Respondent did not recover a
judgment against the Appellant for the full amount she asked
for does not change the fact that the amount- awarded to her
was for alimony, and she had to bring the action to enforce
it. In accordance with the law made and provided in such
cases, she was certainly entitled to recover an attorney's fee ·
for the use and benefit of her attorney in this matter.
Appellant further contends that because the Respondent
was working and earning the sun1 of $130.00 per month, that
this should relieve the Appellant of paying her attorney's fees.
Herzog v. Bramel, 23 P. 2nd, 345:
((Under statutes and codes similar to ours, we think
it is generally recognized that the enforcement by citation or an order to show cause or by contempt proceedings, or orders or decrees with respect to the payment
of monthly or other specific periods of alimony and
counsel fees, for a failure and a willful refusal to pay
the same, is one of the inherent equity powers of the
court. Such has been everyday's practice in this jurisdiction for many years."
\Ve think it will not b~ questioned that the court has the
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right to award attorney's fees and costs in contempt proceedings or orders to show cause, and we need not cite further cases.
The courts have repeatedly held that such awards are
within the sound discretion of the court hearing the matter.
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 Pac. 364. While this
may be based upon necessity, we think the court from th(!
evidence adduced can readily determine the necessity from
the facts. A wife does not have to be .destitute in order to
receive such an award. This court has made such awards in
cases where no testimony was introduced with relation to such
necessities, and we quote the following:
Weis v. Weis, 179 Pac. 2nd 1005 at 1010 (Utah):
HThis appeal is on the judgment roll. We do not
have the testimony on the question of the defendant's
necessity before us, so we must assume that the evidence
supported the awards. The statute does not contemplate the awards for expenses of suit or for temporary
alimony should be made only in those cases where the
'adverse party' (usually the wife) is destitute or
practically so. It contemplates such awards when in the
sound discretion of the court, the circumstances of the
parties are such that in fairness to the wife she should
be given financial assistance by her husband in her
prosecution or defense of the divorce action, and for
her support during its pendency. Keeaer, Marriage and
Divorce (3rd 7d.) Section 604, page 679."
The testimony was that Respondent was earning $130.00
per month, and in comparison with the income of the Appellant and his present wife, she was entitled to attorney's fees
to help her prosecute this action in the sound discretion of
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the court and she should be allo,ved additional attorney's fees
to defray her expenses and counsel fees in this appeal in accordance with the decision of this court in Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 292 Pac. 214.
'There is n1uch more that could be said in this matter
and many more decisions that could be produced, but we think
sufficient has been set forth herein to entitle the Respondent
to have the decision of the trial court sustained in this matter.
Respectfully submitted,

BENJAMIN SPENCE,

Attorney for Respondent.
1309 Walker Bank Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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